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Introduction 
On 21 August 2013, one of the biggest concerns of the international community finally 
materialized: the execution of a large-scale sarin attack in war-torn Syria. Rebel-held 
Damascus suburbs were victim of the attacks and with a death-toll soon estimated between 
500 and 1,300, this would constitute the most lethal chemical weapons attack since the 
1980s.1 Media reports from the attacks were abhorrent, showing dead civilians, as well as 
people still fighting for their lives.2 The attacks drew widespread international condemnation. 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called the attacks a ‘war crime’ and stated: "I trust all 
can join me in condemning this despicable crime. The international community has a 
responsibility to hold the perpetrators accountable."3 US President Obama strongly 
condemned the sarin attacks, calling them “an assault on human dignity” (White House 2013). 
At an emergency meeting in Cairo, foreign ministers of the Arab League held the Assad 
regime responsible for the “heinous” chemical attack and they held that the perpetrators 
should be tried before an international courts “like other war criminals”.4 With the sarin 
attacks, the Syrian civil war, which had already dragged on for 2,5 years, seemed to have 
reached a tipping point: the international community could no longer stand on the sidelines 
and watch these cruelties happen.  
 
Civil War in Syria and Connections with the ‘Libyan Case’ 
The unrest in Syria started in March 2011 as part of the wider Arab Uprising. Syrian 
protesters took the streets in a few major cities to demand the release of political prisoners.5 
The Assad-regime cracked down on the protests and the situation soon escalated with 
increasing violence on both sides. By the end of 2011, Syria had transgressed in a full-scale 
civil war.6 In 2012, after a failed Arab League ‘peace effort’, UN pressure on the Syrian 
regime increased with the sending of special envoys, observers and a General Assembly 
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Resolution condemning the violence in Syria.7 8 Violence, however, only continued to 
escalate on both sides. In August 2012, US President Obama announced that the use of 
chemical weapons would “change his calculation”, marking a shift towards a more 
interventionist position by the US (White House 2012).  
Throughout 2011 and 2012, the UN Security Council was unable to come to an 
agreement on Syria, with multiple drafts being vetoed by Russia and China (Gifkins 2012). 
Western P-5 states pushed for strong condemnation of the Assad-regime and demanded action 
by the Security Council, but Russia and China blocked these efforts (Gifkins 2012). For 
Russia and China, Syria could not be separated from ‘the Libyan experience’, in which a 
Security Council resolution authorizing the enforcement of a no-fly zone eventually led to 
regime-change (Gifkins 2012, 391). The Libyan case is of great relevance to the Syrian 
conflict as both were part of the Arab Uprisings starting in 2011. Moreover, the eventual 
outcome of the Libyan crisis (regime-change after months of NATO airstrikes, whereas the 
former was not part of the mandate of Security Council Resolution 1573)9 put Russia and 
China on their guard in the Syrian case and it helps explaining the gap that emerged between 
Western P-5 states and Russia and China in the UN Security Council (Gifkins 2012).   
In the meantime, the civil war in Syria dragged on and in the spring of 2013, there 
were first reports of (relatively minor) chemical attacks taking place.10 Retrospectively, these 
only constituted the prelude to the much bigger sarin attacks of August 2013, which shocked 
the world’s consciousness. As of today, the conflict in Syria has cost the lives of over a 
160,000 people, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.11    
 
Brief Introduction to the US Position on Intervention in Syria 
The US has been an early advocate of firm action against the Syrian government.12 As early 
as August 2011, after months of violent repression against protesters, President Obama called 
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for Syrian President Assad to resign.13 By then, the US had already applied rounds of 
sanctions against Syria, mostly aimed at curtailing finances.14 In the UN Security Council, the 
US, along with its partners the UK and France, pushed for action against the Syrian regime, 
including sanctions and an arms-embargo (Gifkins 2012). In early-2012, the US government 
still indicated a preference for diplomatic and economic pressure, but started investigating 
military options.15 In August 2012, President Obama further raised the stakes, by announcing 
that the use of chemical weapons would “change his calculus (White House 2012). This was 
understood as a clear signal to the Assad-regime that any attempt to use chemical weapons 
against its own population would not go unanswered. In 2013, the US built up its support for 
the Syrian opposition, in response to reports of small chemical weapon attacks in March and 
April that year (US State Department 2013). It was only after the sarin attacks of August 2013 
that the US government announced its intention to intervene in Syria by military means.16  
 
The August 2013 Sarin Attacks: US Response and Its Reversal 
The US responded with strong condemnation to the sarin attacks of 21 August 2013. The US 
government stated it wanted to hold the Assad-regime (which it deemed responsible for the 
attack) accountable for its deeds. In the days following the Ghouta-attacks, the Obama-
administration built up a case for limited US military action against Syria for its alleged use of 
chemical weapons.17 This announcement of an intention to hold the Assad-regime to account 
by military means did not last long though. On 31 August 2013, President Obama, to the 
surprise of many, announced his decision to postpone the strikes and ask for congressional 
approval (White House 2013). By mid-September, US plans to strike Syria seemed to have 
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definitively reversed, as the US and Russia reached a diplomatic deal that called for the 
peaceful chemical disarmament of Syria.18  
 
The Puzzle of This Research 
The observation of top-level announcements of a military strike and, within a timespan of 
weeks, a complete cancellation of those plans, forms the puzzle of this research. It is puzzling, 
because the White House would probably fear that such a rapid change in policies would 
undermine its credibility. It is also puzzling, because the US did follow through on the 
announcements of military action in the case of Libya. Although this is not a comparative 
case study, some references will be made to the Libyan case in this research, in order to give 
context and meaning to decision-making on Syria.  
The dependent variable under analysis is the shifting US willingness to intervene in 
Syria in the time period extending from 21 August 2013 (when the sarin attacks in the 
Damascus suburbs took place) until 14 September 2013 (with the announcement of a US-
Russian deal on Syria). This temporal analysis provides significant variation on the dependent 
variable: whereas the Obama-administration clearly communicated its willingness to 
intervene in Syria in the days after the sarin attacks, the Administration eventually did not 
follow through on these threats (White House 2013).19 Apparently, somewhere along the road, 
the Administration’s willingness to intervene in the Syrian conflict faltered. The aim of this 
research is then to identify the factors that contributed to Washington’s sudden loss of 
appetite in an intervention an in what way these factors contributed. These factors will in turn 
address the research question of this study: how can US decision-making on intervention in 
Syria in the aftermath of the 2013 sarin attacks be best explained? 
 
Structure of the Research 
This research proceeds in the following way: first, an overview of conventional explanations 
for US willingness to intervene in Syria will be given, along with their limitations. This 
section focuses on those explanations that are often mentioned in the public debate on Syria 
and it serves as a preliminary analysis. Second, the theoretical section will introduce 
alternative explanations for US willingness to intervene in Syria and explain their logic. These 
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explanations are mostly US domestically-oriented, but also include an explanation focused on 
international incentives. Hypotheses and variables will be introduced in this part of the 
research. Third, the use of methods and sources and the case selection will be discussed and 
justified. The method of process-tracing will guide this research, as it is particularly helpful in 
identifying potential answers to the research question. After the discussion of the research 
design, the analysis section will test the hypotheses introduced in the theoretical framework. 
The conclusion of this research will assess the relative explanatory power of the different 
explanations for US willingness to intervene in Syria. It will be argued that the risks and 
unintended consequences of a military operation and strong opposition by the Pentagon were 
the main factors in dissuading the Obama-administration from the ‘strikes’ against Syria. The 
final part of the conclusion will discuss the significance of these findings and their relevance 
for both academia and policy-making.  
 
 
The Limitations of Conventional Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in 
Syria  
Syria in Crisis: Different Levels of Analysis  
In general, there are two levels of analysis to crises like the one in Syria: a domestic and an 
international level. The prevailing explanations for (non-)intervention in Syria in the 
academic and public debate have generally focused on factors pertaining to the Syrian conflict 
itself (Syria’s domestic dimension) or on international factors (the international dimension). 
The former includes factors like Syria’s military capabilities (that could pose a challenge to 
intervention), shifting balances of power on the ground and changes in the opposition 
(radicalization, fragmentation, infighting etc.). The latter constitutes an even broader category, 
including but not limited to UN Security Council dealings with the crisis (Gifkins 2012; 
Mohamed 2013), the involvement of outside state actors (ranging from the US to Turkey and 
Russia to Iran), regional organizations (e.g. the Arab League), outside non-state actors (such 
as extremist groups like Al-Nusra, finding their origins elsewhere in the region) and private 
individuals (e.g. Western ‘jihadists’ who often travel by themselves to these conflict 
areas).The issues of R2P (the Responsibility to Protect) (Morris 2013), and human rights in 
Syria have also been related to discussions of intervention in the academic debate (Marauhn 
2013).  
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Given the prevalence of these ‘Syria-domestic’ and international explanations for 
(non-)intervention in Syria in the public and the academic debate, this literature review will 
focus on a few prominent ones. 
 
Prevailing Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in Syria and Their Weaknesses  
Syria’s military capabilities 
Hypothesis: the greater Syria’s military capabilities, the less likely the US government will be 
willing to intervene in Syria 
One of the interpretations of Washington’s reluctance to intervene in Syria is that the US was 
genuinely concerned about Assad’s military capabilities. Some analysts in the field have 
warned against the risks of comparing the Syrian case to the earlier intervention in Libya.20 
They argued that Assad’s military capabilities by far exceeded those that the Gaddafi-regime 
possessed during the Libyan civil war.21 Since the outbreak of the civil war, the Assad-regime 
has considerably upgraded its air- and sea-attack capabilities.22 It allegedly spent billions on 
state-of-the-art Russian weapon systems, including antiaircraft missiles, combat aircraft and 
tanks. These advanced weapon systems would constitute a considerable challenge for the 
enforcement of a  no-fly zone as was done in Libya under Security Council Resolution 
1973.23 In July 2013, US General Dempsey conceded that “Assad’s regime could withstand 
limited air strikes.”24  
This explanation, however, only explains why the US would have a general reluctance 
towards intervention in Syria. It is not particularly helpful though, in explaining why the US 
first announced to intervene in Syria in late-August 2013, but in the end chose not to do so. 
Therein lies the weakness of this explanation. If the US was really concerned about the 
capabilities of the Syrian military, President Obama would probably not have not made his 
“red lines” statement in August 2012, warning the Assad-regime against using chemical 
weapons against its own population (White House 2012). After all, why would you make such 
a threat, if you are not sure you can follow through on it, because of the strength of the 
opponent’s military? The same logic counts for the announcements of strikes in late-August 
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2013. So, although the capabilities of the Syrian military will have probably played some role 
in Washington’s calculus, it is unlikely to have been a decisive factor in deciding whether to 
intervene or not in the conflict in the aftermath of the sarin attacks.    
 
Radicalization of the armed Syrian opposition 
Hypothesis: The greater the radicalization of the Syrian opposition, the less likely the US 
government will be willing to intervene in Syria 
A second risk warranting against intervention is that it might create a power vacuum. Whereas 
many in the West despise the Assad-regime, the question is whether the alternative would be 
preferable. Since 2012, the armed Syrian opposition has clearly radicalized, with inter alia  
Salafist militant groups having joined the ranks of the opposition.25 The attitude of the 
moderate opposition towards the more extremist factions has been ambivalent: at the one 
hand, most moderates reject the extremist ideologies of these groups, but at the other hand, 
they welcome the inflow of hardened fighters and a more reliable stream of resources in terms 
of money and arms.26 The divisions within the Syrian opposition are only widening: in 
September 2013, some of the extremist groups explicitly rejected the authority of the Syrian 
opposition-in-exile.27 This bears the question what will happen to Syria in a post-Assad era. 
The odds that extremist factions will be the ones filling up the power vacuum after Assad 
‘leaves’ are great enough to warrant against intervention.28   
 Whereas the radicalization of the Syrian opposition has appeared to be a real concern 
to Washington,29 this again does not adequately explain the change in intervention policies in 
August/September 2013. There was clear evidence of radical factions joining the Syrian 
opposition as early as 2012,30 the year that President Obama issued his ‘red-lines’ statement. 
If the US government would have been genuinely concerned about the risks of a post-Assad 
‘fundamentalist’ Syria, it would have thought twice before drawing a red line in August 2012. 
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One may assume that President Obama had the potential unintended consequences of an 
intervention in mind when he drew his line. In the same vein, if the radicalization of the 
Syrian opposition was truly an overwhelming concern to Washington, the White House would 
probably not have announced its intentions to launch strikes against Syria in response to the 
August 2013 sarin attacks.  
 
Internationalization of the Syrian civil war 
Hypothesis: The greater the internationalization of the Syrian civil war, the less likely the US 
government will be willing to intervene in Syria 
The rapid internationalization of Syria’s civil war has also made intervention an unattractive 
option. As of now, a wide array of actors is involved in the Syrian conflict, ranging from state 
actors (US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf States etc.) to organized non-state actors (extremist 
groups like Al-Nusra) and from international organizations (the UN, but also regional 
organizations like the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council) to private 
individuals.31 The UN has been involved since the very start of the civil war. It has been 
rather ineffective, though, in mediating the conflict.32 Multiple special envoys were sent 
without any concrete results.33 34 Most importantly, the UN Security Council was paralyzed 
on the Syrian question for more than two years, until the US and Russia managed to broker a 
deal on the disarmament of Syria’s chemical arsenals.35 Regional organizations like the Arab 
League and the Gulf Cooperation Council have also been engaged, all with their own 
agendas. A more recent development is the influx of organized non-state actors from the 
region. Amongst these groups of guerilla fighters -often with war experience elsewhere in the 
region- are extremist groups, like Al Nusra, which was designated a terrorist organization by 
the US government in late 2012.36 The proliferation of actors involved in the Syrian conflict 
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makes it increasingly complicated to intervene: if one decides to intervene,  on whose behalf 
would that be? If one intervenes on behalf of the opposition (as far as one can still speak of 
one opposition), one indirectly supports the agendas of Turkey, Al-Nusra and the Gulf States 
as well. On the contrary,  if one abstains from intervention, this can be viewed as implicit 
support for the Assad-regime, backed by states like Russia and Iran. 
 The weakness of this explanation, however, is that the Syrian civil war was already 
greatly internationalized by mid-2012. By then, the UN had already sent a special envoy (Kofi 
Annan) and observatory missions to the conflict, the Arab League had been involved with a 
mission of its own and state actors ranging from the US to Iran and from Russia to Turkey all 
exerted at least indirect influence on the conflict.37 It was against this context of a highly 
internationalized civil war that President Obama drew his red line in August 2012 (White 
House 2012). And it was against the context of an even more internationalized civil war, that 
the Obama-administration announced its plan for ‘limited military strikes’ against Syria in 
late 2013 (White House 2013). So, whereas the high degree of internationalization obviously 
made it ‘trickier’ to intervene in Syria, this explanation does fail to account for the change in 
intervention policies in August/September 2013.   
 
 
Alternative Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
Zooming in on US Domestic Factors and Increasing the Variance of the Independent 
Variables 
The weaknesses of the explanations discussed in the literature review demonstrate the need 
for alternative explanations. First of all, it is important to look at factors that played a role 
beyond the international context of the Syrian civil war. When analyzing US decision-making 
on Syria, it is vital to zoom in on domestic political factors in the US, such as the role of  
Congress, bureaucratic politics and the influence of public opinion. After all, these factors 
have an impact on the ability of the US government to pursue foreign policy objectives on the  
international arena. The domestic factors under analysis are linked to three hypotheses, which 
are put to the test in the analysis section of this research. Although this research has a focus on 
US domestic factors, international factors, obviously at play in the Syrian conflict, will not be 
overlooked. In order to justice to them, a final hypothesis will consider these international 
incentives. This way, this research will have two sets of competing hypotheses: one set with 
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domestic explanations (three hypotheses) and one set with international explanations (one 
hypothesis).  
    A second limitation of the explanations reviewed in the literature review was that they 
‘operated’ too much as parameters: all of these factors did not significantly change in the 
period of 21 August – mid-September 2013. That was the main reason they could not account 
for the change in US intervention policies in the time period under analysis. The explanations 
and variables proposed in this section do show variance, which make them more suitable for 
addressing the research question of this study: ‘how can US decision-making on intervention 
in Syria in the aftermath of the 2013 sarin attacks be best explained?’  
 
Domestic Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
 
Explanation 1: Institutional Checks on the US Government’s Ability to Authorize the 
Use of Force 
Logic  
The institutional framework of a state has a great effect on the ability of the executive to 
freely and autonomously pursue foreign policy goals. Logically, in states with highly 
constrained executives, the executive will find more obstacles to translate desired foreign 
policy outcomes in real outcomes than in states in which executives can operate relatively 
freely in foreign affairs. In this study, ‘the executive’ refers to those governmental bodies 
charged with foreign affairs and the use of force, as these are the topics under consideration. 
For the US, this includes the President, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. 
This explanation focuses on the relevant constitutional and congressional checks on the US 
executive’s ability to execute foreign policy goals and authorize the use of force.  
 The US Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
cl. 11),  while it grants the President, in its role as Commander-in-Chief, the power to direct 
the military after a congressional declaration of war (U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2). These provisions 
thus require cooperation between the President and Congress, with Congress funding or 
declaring operations and the President directing them (Legal Information Institute 2014). In 
practice, however, Presidents have often engaged in military operations without express 
congressional consent (Legal Information Institute 2014). In response, Congress passed the 
War Powers Resolution in 1973, which requires that the President communicate to Congress 
the committal of troops within 48 hours and limits troop deployment to 60 days, after which 
Congress has to vote on extension (Legal Information Institute 2014). The War Powers 
Resolution, however, has rarely been invoked in practice (Howell and Pevehouse 2007). 
13 
 
Moreover, it is important to note that “overt actions” (such as the number of times the War 
Powers Resolution has been invoked) say very little about the strength of congressional 
checks on presidential war powers (Howell and Pevehouse 2007, 17). As Howell and 
Pevehouse (2007, 23) observe: “At the front of a military venture, members of Congress 
usually do not enact laws that either endorse or oppose the president’s plans. Instead, 
members more often effect change indirectly, participating in larger debates about the  
efficacy of military action, raising concerns about the costs involved, and expressing doubts 
about the plans laid before the American public.” Since this research looks at a period “at the 
front of a military venture”, the focus will thus be on the concerns and doubts raised by 
lawmakers as opposed to more formal congressional action such as lawmaking.  
 
Variables and indicators        I=indicators 
 IV: the strength of constitutional and congressional checks on the US government 
with respect to the authorization of the use of force 
o I: what are the constitutional requirements for using force? 
o I: what are the congressional checks on the use of force? 
o I: was there discernible congressional opposition to a US intervention in 
Syria? 
 
Hypothesis 
H1: the stronger the constitutional and the congressional checks on the President with 
respect to the use of force, the less likely the US government will be willing to intervene in 
Syria 
 
Causal mechanism 
Constitutional requirements and congressional checks put constraints on the US government 
when it comes to foreign policy making in general and the use of force in specific. The 
constitutional limits on the use of force and acts like the War Powers Resolution restrict the 
government’s authority in war times (Legal Information Institute 2014). Besides formal-
institutional checks, Congress can increase the political costs of the presidential use of force 
by raising doubts and concerns and voicing objections (Howell and Pevehouse 2007, 23). 
Even though the US government is offered some discretion when it comes to the use of force, 
it depends on Congress for funding and political support (Howell and Pevehouse 2007). Every 
Administration knows that the costs of fighting a war without support in Congress will come 
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at a price: a price that will be paid in the next elections. In practice this means that the US 
government has to respond to congressional concerns, either in anticipation or in reaction to 
them.  
 
Observable implications38 
For the outcome: 
 If one observes strong constitutional and congressional checks on the presidential use 
of force, then one should see a US government less willing to intervene in Syria. 
For the process: 
 A change in presidential policies regarding the use of force would be preceded by: 
o Intense congressional debates on the use of force 
o Congressmen raising concerns, doubts and objections to the Administration’s 
plans to use force in public and in the media 
o Congressmen emphasizing constitutional constraints to the presidential use of 
force 
o Congressmen threatening to use constitutional/legal measures to constrain the 
presidential use of force 
 
Explanation 2: The Influence of Bureaucratic Politics on Foreign Policy Making and the 
Use of Force 
Logic  
The “bureaucratic politics-approach” to foreign policy rejects the notion of the state as a 
‘black box’. Instead, it analyses how the structure of the policy-making process influences the 
resulting decisions. The ‘bureaucratic politics’ model allows for a divergence of interests 
within the state: essentially, it rejects the notion of concepts like ‘the national interest’, as 
there is just a set of actors pursuing different perceived interests. So, whereas ‘Explanation 1’ 
still treated the branches of the state as unitary actors (the executive vs. Congress, the 
executive vs. the constitutional order etc.), this theory zooms in further. It therefore allows for 
conflicts of interest within state branches, such as the US executive. Decisions eventually 
arise from arenas of contest in which the balance of advantage is constantly shifting 
(Heywood 2011, 132).  
                                                                 
38
 N.B. for all lists of observable implications in this theoretical section counts: these lists are not exhaustive, nor 
do all listed observable implications have to be present to find evidence for the hypothesis to which they belong 
(George and Bennett 2005, 174-176)  
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Variables and indicators        I=indicators 
 IV: bureaucratic infighting  
The focus here will be on bureaucratic infighting in the executive, in this case the 
Obama-administration. A good way to conceptualize this is to assess whether the 
Obama-administration acts in unity. An administration acting ‘in unity’ would mean 
that actors within the administration share and communicate similar visions, goals and 
interests. In an administration plagued with bureaucratic infighting, on the contrary, 
actors communicate different and sometimes even conflicting visions, goals and 
interests.  
o I: do government agencies express conflicting visions, goals and/or interests to 
the media/public? 
o I: are there discernible clashes within the Obama-administration? For 
instance, reported on by the media or in public discourse? 
 
Hypothesis 
H2: The greater the degree of ‘bureaucratic infighting’ within the Obama-administration, 
the less likely the US government will be willing to intervene in Syria 
 
Causal mechanism 
The bureaucratic politics model could explain fluctuations in the willingness to intervene over 
time, rightly because it allows for the presence of different and even conflicting interests 
within the Obama-administration. According to the model, actors within the Obama-
administration (departments, officials etc.) are likely to have different ideas about the wisdom 
of an intervention in Syria. The decision that is eventually taken on intervention is then the 
result of the ability of these actors to convince their colleagues of their interpretation of the 
situation in Syria and their policy preferences. The President’s perception of the 
‘attractiveness’ of the option of intervention also depends on bureaucratic processes: if he is 
exposed to conflicting information about the merits of intervention and if he is opposed by 
officials and agencies within his own Administration on the matter, he may be inclined to 
look for alternative policy options.      
 
Observable implications 
For the outcome: 
16 
 
 If one observes instances of bureaucratic infighting and divisions within the Obama-
administration, then one should see a US government less willing to intervene in 
Syria. 
For the process: 
 A change in presidential policies regarding the use of force would be preceded by: 
o Government agencies expressing different/conflicting visions, goals and/or 
interests 
o Instances of disagreement, discord and quarrels within the Obama-
administration 
 
Explanation 3: The Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Making and the Use 
of Force 
Logic  
In democratic states, public opinion can be assumed to play a considerable role in policy 
making. Public opinion is the means by which voters inform decision-makers which policies 
receive approval and which not. This then puts pressures on decision-makers (constantly 
having elections in the back of their mind) to choose the policies that receive the highest 
public approval (Tomz 2009). In this way, public opinion constraints the ability of the 
executive to arrive at desired foreign policy outcomes (assuming that these are not always in 
line with the public’s preferences). 
The acknowledgement that governments have to take their domestic audience into 
account when acting on the international arena has been very influential in the literature. It 
was Putnam  (1988) who proposed a model that includes the reciprocal influence between 
domestic and international affairs. Unlike state-centric theories (such as Realism), the two-
level approach recognizes that the concept of “national interest” cannot be taken for granted, 
and domestic conflict over it often arises (Putnam 1988, 460). The two-level approach 
recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international 
imperatives simultaneously (Putnam 1988). Relating Putnam’s work to the case at hand, it 
shows that the US is not managing the Syrian crisis as a unitary actor, but as a “contested 
arena” in which different domestic actors try to win over the foreign policy result they desire. 
 The notion that international relations and domestic politics are intricately linked is 
also central to the ‘audience costs thesis’. This thesis builds further on Putnam’s model of 
two-level-games and holds that leaders are vulnerable to domestic backlash when operating 
on the international arena (Tomz 2009, 827). This specifically applies to making threats: when 
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statesmen make threats on the international arena, but then do not follow through, this almost 
inevitably leads to domestic backlash (Tomz 2009, 827). Tomz (2009, 829) defines his central 
concept, audience costs, as “committing and not following through”. The evidence of his 
research indicates that empty commitments cause disapproval of leaders to surge (Tomz 2009, 
830). The audience costs thesis is very applicable to this research, as US President Obama 
issued a threat against the Assad-regime in August 2012, stating that there are red lines that 
cannot be crossed without sanctions (White House 2012). Some authors and news media have 
discarded this statement as an empty threat, as the Obama-administration eventually cancelled 
a planned military strike on Syria after the August 2013 chemical attacks.   
 
Variables and indicators        I=indicators 
 IV: US public opinion on the issue of  intervention in Syria. Both the salience of the 
issue (does the American public care about this foreign policy topic?) and the nature 
of public opinion on the topic (positive/neutral/negative) will be assessed.  
 Dimension I: salience of the issue of (a potential) intervention  
o I: results of public opinion polls on salience questions 
 Dimension II: nature of the public opinion (negative/neutral/positive) 
o I: public attitudes towards intervention expressed in public opinion polls 
 
Hypotheses  
H3a (conditional hypothesis): the higher the salience of the issue of intervention to the 
public, the more likely the President will take public opinion into account when making a 
decision on intervention 
 
H3b (main hypothesis): given high salience (H3a fulfilled), the nature of public opinion 
will have an impact on the nature of the eventual foreign policy decision. The stronger the 
public is turned against an intervention, the less likely the US government will be willing to 
intervene in Syria 
 
Causal mechanism 
Assuming that public opinion plays a considerable role in policy-making in democratic states, 
the salience of policy issues matter. If the public does not care about a particular policy issue, 
public opinion is unlikely to affect policy-making. If, on the contrary, the public feels very 
strong about a policy issue, this is likely to have an effect on policy-making. Second, the 
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nature of public opinion matters. If public opinion on a policy issue is negative (for instance, 
reluctant towards intervention in Syria) this will likely constrain policy-making (the political 
costs of the option of intervention have increased). The combination of issue salience and 
nature of the public opinion then interacts: when an issue is highly salient and the public 
mood is strong into one direction (either positive or negative), public opinion is quite likely to 
inform policy choices in democratic states. More related to the case at hand: public 
disapproval of an intervention in Syria (if established) could have played a role in the White 
House’s decision to retreat from its earlier announcements to intervene in Syria.  
 
Observable implications  
For the outcome: 
 If one observes a strong and highly negative public mood on intervention, then one 
should see a US government less willing to intervene in Syria. 
For the process: 
 A change in presidential policies regarding the use of force would be preceded by: 
o A strong public mood on the proposed intervention (high salience of the issue 
of intervention) 
o Public opinion polls showing that many Americans (pluralities or majorities) 
do not support the proposed plan of action regarding the use of force 
o Congressmen emphasizing concerns of their constituents and public opinion in 
general  
o Administration officials indicating that they assign weight to public opinion in 
their decision to use force 
 
International Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
 
Explanation 4: The Influence of International Incentives on Foreign Policy Making and 
the Use of Force 
Logic  
This hypothesis looks at the international incentives for US intervention in Syria. What 
factors on the international arena (the need to uphold international law, US credibility in the 
world, the risk of being engaged in too many conflicts at the same time etc.) and factors ‘on 
the ground’ (feasibility of a military operation, the effects of a military operations on the 
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balance of power in Syria etc.) have likely played a role in US decision-making on 
intervention in Syria?  
 Given the complexity of the case at hand, the analysis of this hypothesis does not 
pretend to give a definitive account of all international and ‘on-the-ground’ factors that may 
have influenced Washington’s decision-making on intervention in the Syrian conflict. Instead, 
it is an attempt to identify the main factors and processes that may have eventually dissuaded 
the US from an intervention in Syria. These factors are divided into two main categories in the 
section below: normative (legal and moral) and strategic (political and military) and 
incentives for intervention. The variables within these categories will be analyzed in the 
analysis section. They are part of the more general hypothesis that, at the end of the day, not 
domestic political factors, but international incentives carried the day in US decision-making 
on intervention in Syria. This last hypothesis thus serves as a test case for the domestic 
explanations for US willingness to intervene in Syria that are central in this research. If there 
is overwhelming support for the hypothesis that international incentives dissuaded the US 
from intervening in Syria, this weakens the proposition underlying this research, namely that 
US domestic factors played a significant and generally overlooked role in US decision-
making on intervention in Syria 
 
Variables and indicators        I=indicators 
 IV: international incentives   
Normative  
o Legal incentives 
 Upholding of international law and norms 
 I: intensity with which international law and norms are 
mentioned in government officials’ speeches 
o Moral incentives 
 Upholding of state’s own values on the international arena 
 O: intensity with which own values are mentioned in 
government officials’ speeches    
Strategic     
o Political incentives 
 Political/military credibility of the US  in the world 
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 I: occasions on which US political/military credibility is 
mentioned in government documents/expert analyses 
 War-weary American public 
 I: occasions on which American war-weariness is mentioned in 
speeches and statements by White House officials  
 Risk of ‘imperial overstretch’ (a situation in which a state extends itself 
beyond its ability to maintain or expand its military and economic 
commitments (Kennedy 1989)) 
 I: occasions on which the risk of imperial overstretch (or 
something similar to that) is mentioned in government 
documents/expert analyses 
 World sentiment on potential US strikes on Syria 
 I: results of relevant public opinion polls  in third countries 
 I: statements by foreign leaders and governments   
 Availability of credible alternatives to strikes against Syria 
 I: the availability of credible alternatives to the US 
government’s plan to conduct a ‘limited military strike’ against 
Syria. In order for an alternative to be credible, the US must 
consider it as good or better than the current option (strikes) 
o Material incentives 
 Feasibility and effectiveness of a ‘limited military strike’ 
 I: comments on the feasibility and effectiveness of a ‘limited 
military strike’ by US officials and outside experts 
 Risks and potential ‘unintended consequences’ of a ‘limited military 
strike’ 
 comments on the risks and potential ‘unintended consequences’ 
of a ‘limited military strike’ by US officials and outside experts 
  
Hypothesis 
H4: the stronger the international incentives warranting against intervention in the Syrian 
conflict, the less likely the US government will be willing to intervene in Syria 
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Causal mechanism 
The incentives summed up above can be treated as independent variables that either increase 
the odds of an intervention or decrease the odds of an intervention. For instance, the stronger 
the US feels about upholding international norms (such as the prohibition of the use of 
chemical weapons), the more likely it is that it will intervene in the Syrian conflict. How, 
then, could these factors explain the willingness by the Obama-administration to use force in 
Syria over time? The Administration’s willingness to intervene in the aftermath of the sarin 
attacks and its (un)willingness to do so a few weeks later may be explained by the relative 
weight assigned to various international incentives over time. Moral, political and material 
considerations have most certainly all played a role in the President’s equation and the 
analysis will have to show which of these considerations eventually emerged as most 
influential in the Administration’s decision-making on intervention in Syria.   
 
Observable implications  
For the outcome: 
 If one observes important international incentives warranting against US intervention 
in Syria, then one should see a US government less willing to intervene in Syria. 
For the process: 
 A change in presidential policies regarding the use of force would be preceded by: 
o A decrease in the weight assigned to international incentives supporting the use 
of force 
o An increase in the weight assigned to international incentives warranting 
against the use of force 
 
 
Research Design  
Method 
For this research, the method of process-tracing seems to be especially suited, because “it 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process- the causal chain and causal mechanisms- 
between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 206). This is exactly what this research attempts to do: it is an 
attempt to identify the “causes of effect”, in which ‘the effect’ (a ‘varying’ US willingness to 
intervene in Syria in the period 21 August- mid-September eventually culminating in non-
intervention) is already known. In the literature review, some ‘causes’ (or explanations) for 
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this outcome were identified, but because of their limitations, alternative explanations were 
proposed in the theoretical section of this paper. It is the aim of this research to identify 
through which causal pathways these variables operated and ultimately had an effect on the 
outcome (if they did at all). Process-tracing will then help in assessing the unique contribution 
of the different independent variables in producing the observed outcome of US non-
intervention in Syria.  
To illustrate this with an example: it could be that, at first sight, it seems that 
congressional opposition and public opinion both played an important role in dissuading 
President Obama from intervening in Syria. However, this says little about how congressional 
opposition and public opinion helped producing the outcome of a cancellation of the strikes. 
The causal pathway of these factors then helps in assessing which of these two factors may 
have mattered most. For instance, if congressional opposition against an intervention in Syria 
appears to be purely based on constituents' attitudes towards intervention, we may as well say 
that public opinion was the ‘root cause’ in producing the outcome here. For if public opinion 
was not turned against an intervention, Congress would not have been either. Such a causal 
analysis would show that public opinion (in this simplified example) was the leading factor in 
producing the outcome of non-intervention in Syria. If, however, it turns out that 
Congressmen were concerned about more than their constituents alone (for instance, about the 
effectiveness of the strikes, the risk that strikes could escalate the situation in Syria etc.) in 
their assessment of intervention in Syria, congressional opposition could carry potential 
causal weight next to the factor of public opinion.  
 
Case Selection 
Explanatory Advantages of the Case Selection 
The case selection of the US has the major advantage that it allows me to look into the 
decision-making of one of the global players with the biggest leverage on the Syrian conflict. 
As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the US holds a veto on every decision 
taken in this body (UN 2014). Since the UN Security Council is the main forum in which 
global decisions are taken on Syria, this veto power is very significant. Besides, the US has 
major ‘informal’ power sources: given its sizeable economic and military power, it can press 
and credibly threaten actors, such as the Syrian regime. More concretely, the US  announced a 
military strike against the Assad-regime, after the alleged use of chemical weapons by this 
regime in August 2013 (White House 2013). The US thereby seemed to back an earlier 
statement made by President Obama in 2012, warning the Assad-regime that “the use of 
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chemical weapons would be totally unacceptable” (White House 2012). The fact that the US 
eventually did not follow through on this threat forms a very interesting research puzzle: how 
can one draw a red line and then, when it seems to have been crossed, not enforce it, while 
still maintaining credibility? The clear tension between these objectives makes US decision-
making on Syria an excellent case of inquiry for this research.  
 
Explanatory Disadvantages of the Case Selection 
The inherent disadvantage of a single case study is that it is hard to generalize. After having 
read this research, one might have gained understanding as to why the US acted as it did in 
response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria in August 2013. However, given the 
uniqueness of this case, how much will these findings tell about the more general phenomena 
it relates to, such as decision-making on intervention and foreign policy making? George and 
Bennett (2005) argue that case studies can contribute to theory development about broader 
phenomena. It is possible to generalize from unique cases “by treating them as members of a 
class or type of phenomenon; that is, as instances of alliance formation, deterrence, war 
initiation” etc. (George and Bennett 2005, 112-113). The case study of this research, focusing 
on US decision-making on intervention in Syria, could then be treated as an instance of ‘the 
impact of domestic politics on foreign policy making and the use of force’ or ‘decision-
making on intervention’. This approach would allow for making contingent generalizations 
(George and Bennett 2005, 112).    
 
Data Collection 
Evidence for this research is derived from academic articles, news articles, government 
documents and press releases, poll data, voting behavior in US Congress and the UN Security 
Council and think tank analyses. The advantage of looking at the US is that all sources are in 
English, which makes this project more feasible. 
 
 
Testing the Alternative Explanations for US Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
This analysis section will test the hypotheses introduced in the theoretical section one by one.  
At the end of every explanation, a provisional statement on the weight of the factor under 
consideration is provided. 
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Institutional Checks on the US Government’s Ability to Authorize the Use of Force  
To establish that congressional and constitutional influences made the Obama-administration  
change course on Syria, one needs to look at the record of what happened between mid-
August 2013 and mid-September 2013. Did Congress voice concerns over the announced 
intervention in Syria? And if so, on what grounds? If it were just on some minor grounds, 
President Obama could have been assumed to take these blocks from the road, as any 
President needs to when gathering support for an upcoming intervention (Howell and 
Pevehouse 2007). In order to bring structure to the analysis, three periods are discerned: first, 
the period in the direct aftermath of the sarin attacks, in which the Administration assigned 
responsibility to the Assad-regime and built up its case of an intervention to punish the 
regime. Second, the period after August 31 (the day on which the Administration announced 
it would seek congressional approval), in which the Administration attempted to convince 
Congress about its plans. Third, a period, starting on September 9, in which the plan of an 
intervention gradually disappeared from the table, making room for a plan in which the 
international community called on the Assad-regime to give up on its chemical arsenals.  
 
Period 1:The Administration Building Up Its Case    21 Aug. – 30 Aug. 
After having heard of the sarin attacks in Damascus of 21 August 2013, Washington had to 
respond. In August 2012, President Obama had made publicly clear that “the use of chemical 
weapons would be totally unacceptable”, and there were “red lines”, thereby implying that 
any use of chemical weapons by the Assad-regime would not go unanswered (White House 
2012). First of all, it was up to the Administration to establish whom had committed the sarin 
attacks committed. In the days after the attacks, the Obama-administration quickly built up 
what seemed to be a solid case: US intelligence had showed the Assad-regime and its forces 
preparing to use chemical weapons and then launching the rockets in the highly populated, 
opposition-controlled suburbs of Damascus (White House 2013). It also detected “after-attack 
euphoria” among Syrian officials, which supported the Administration’s conviction that the 
Syrian regime was behind the attacks (White House 2013). What added to suspicion was that 
the regime did not immediately allow a UN-inspectors team to the area. Instead, it shelled the 
area, which was still under opposition control after the sarin attacks of 21 August.39 It was 
only on 26 August, after four days of intensive shelling and clashes between government and 
                                                                 
39
 The Telegraph, “Syria: John Kerry's statement in full ,” The Telegraph, 30 August, 2013,   
  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10277442/Syria -John-Kerrys- 
  statement-in-full.html (accessed June 8, 2014).   
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opposition forces that UN inspectors could start their work.40 The US government saw this 
again as a piece of evidence that the Syrian regime had something to hide. The Administration 
was also reluctant to wait for evidence from the UN inspections. As Secretary of State John 
Kerry put it: “The UN investigation will not affirm who used these chemical weapons (…), 
they will only affirm whether such weapons were used. By the definition of their own 
mandate, the UN can’t tell us anything that we don’t already know.”41 In the days following 
the sarin attacks, the Obama-administration thus firmly attributed responsibility for the sarin 
attacks to the Assad-regime and it seemed to be in a hurry to respond.   
 The next step in the process for the Administration was to come up with an 
appropriate response to the sarin attacks. US government officials soon announced plans to 
conduct a “limited military strike” on Syria, an effort initially supported by the UK and 
France.42 The aim of the plan was to punish the Assad-regime and to deter the future use of 
chemical weapons.43 As the Administration was gathering international support, it did not 
overlook to build support at home. Congress was still on recess in the first few days after the 
sarin attacks, but some Congressmen already voiced concerns about the plans for a military 
intervention in Syria. President Obama first acknowledged this on 31 August 2013, when he 
stated in his address to the nation on Syria: “Over the last several days, we’ve heard from 
members of Congress who want their voices to be heard. I absolutely agree. So this morning, I 
spoke with all four congressional leaders, and they’ve agreed to schedule a debate and then a 
vote as soon as Congress comes back into session (White House 2013). This marked a 
significant change in the Administration’s rhetoric, as its message before that day was more 
unidirectional: it assertively tried to convince the world and the American public that the US 
had to act, and there was no time for second-guessing. Apparently, the Administration had 
changed its mind around 31 August, but for what reason?  
 Technically, the Administration did not have to go to Congress with the request for 
congressional approval: the War Powers Resolution grants the Administration the opportunity 
to authorize military force for 60 days without congressional approval (Legal Information 
Institute 2014). A possible motivation for the Administration’s unexpected move is that it 
anticipated more widespread congressional opposition once Congress would be back from 
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recess. Given the fact that both sides of the political spectrum already started voicing concerns 
about the Administration’s plans in the days preceding August 31, this is not implausible.44 
The lawmakers that spoke up about the intervention, primarily voiced concerns on two 
grounds: first, they expressed their concern that the Administration would go along with its 
plans without consulting Congress and second, some of them had doubts on the merits of the 
Administration’s plans for strikes against Syria. Most of this criticism came in after UK 
Prime-Minister Cameron failed to convince the House of Commons to support an intervention 
in Syria.45 With this important coalition partner disappearing from the scene, US domestic 
opposition  increased.46 47 The fact that Congressmen indicated they wanted to be consulted 
on the Syrian issue partly explains why the Administration decided to seek congressional 
approval. Another explanation is that the Administration needed a solid basis of support 
somewhere: with falling international support, it decided to build support at home, so that the 
political fortunes of a potential intervention could be shared with Congress.48  
 
Period 2: The Administration Seeking Congressional Approval  31 Aug. – 9 Sept.  
The paradox is that, after the Administration announced it would consult Congress on the 
Syrian issue, congressional opposition only increased.49 While many Congressmen applauded 
the Administration’s decision to seek congressional authorization for its plans, much 
skepticism was voiced over the merits of an intervention.50 Many lawmakers questioned the 
wisdom of a military intervention in Syria. The grounds on which they objected were diverse: 
some mentioned the concerns of their constituents, others held that more international support 
was needed for an intervention, whereas a third group expressed doubts about the 
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effectiveness of strikes.51 52 The Administration was severely scrutinized in a House hearing 
on the issue on September 4.53 Some Republican lawmakers called the Syrian issue another 
foreign policy ‘fumble’ of the Obama-administration, after the Benghazi-attacks, NSA-
scandals and previous indecisiveness in the Syrian case (Republican Rep. Joe Wilson 
questioned why there was no call for a military response after alleged chemical attacks in 
April 2013).54 Moreover, opposition at the hearing was not only heard from Republican side: 
Democratic Rep. Alan Grayson vowed to encourage his colleagues to vote against the 
resolution to strike Syria. This was not the most encouraging sign for his co-partisans in the 
Administration, Secretary of State Kerry and Secretary of Defense Hagel, who were 
struggling to defend the Administration’s case.55 
 The Administration was not completely without support: of the ‘Big Four’, only 
Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell was reluctant in supporting the Administration’s 
call for military strikes against Syria (Republican House Speaker John Boehner, Democratic 
House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid had 
already expressed their support for the President).56 The support of Republican senators John 
McCain and Lindsey Graham was also important for the Administration: as two leading 
lawmakers on national security issues of the opposition party, they had the potential capacity 
to swing fellow-Republicans. Still, the Administration faced a tough challenge: Democrats 
occupied a majority in the Senate (54-46), but 60 votes would be needed to clear “anticipated 
procedural roadblocks”.57 Things went downhill for the Administration on Monday 9 
September, when six senators, including five Republicans and one Democrat, announced they 
would vote against a resolution authorizing the use of force (see Figure 1 for Congressmen’s 
voting intentions at the time, showing that the Administration would likely have lost a vote on 
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the use-of-force resolution).58 This was a clear signal that the Administration’s efforts to build 
bipartisan effort had been ineffective and it prompted Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, to 
delay a procedural vote on the issue.59 At the same time, news began to spread that there 
could be a way out for the Administration, as Russia proposed a plan of chemical 
disarmament to Syria.60  
 
Figure 1: voting intentions Congress on intervention in Syria on 11 September 2013
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Period 3: The Administration Changing Course    9 Sept. – 14 Sept. 
It was around 9 September 2013 that the Obama-administration seemed to change course on 
the Syrian question. Until that day, the Administration had put much effort in convincing 
Capitol Hill and the American public of the need to strike Syria. On multiple occasions, the 
President himself and top aides, such as Secretary of State Kerry, delivered the case against 
the Assad-regime and updated the public on the preparations for a strike against Syria (White 
House 2013a). On Monday September 9, however, the President for the first time conceded 
that he might lose his campaign in Congress for authorization: “I wouldn’t say I’m confident,” 
he said, when asked about the outcome in an NBC interview.61     
 President Obama also welcomed the earlier mentioned Russian proposal to place 
Syria’s chemical weapons under international control.62 This encouraged a bipartisan group of 
influential senators to start working on a new Syria resolution. Their resolution would 
postpone a military strike against Syria and, similar to the Russian proposal, called for the 
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chemical disarmament of Syria by a certain date.63 If the Assad-regime would not fully 
comply, the President could still launch limited military action.64   
By this time, it can be reasonably argued that the Administration’s original plan of a  
“limited military strike” was slowly moving from the table. The support for the use-of-force 
resolution had been eroding since the start of September, most visibly during the House 
hearing and the public announcement of a group of lawmakers that they would vote against. 
The Administration, publicly welcoming the Russian proposal (although with some caveats), 
also signaled that it was no longer fully committed to go ahead with the strikes.65 Last, the 
Administration was aware of the drafting efforts of the bipartisan group and did not 
counteract these, for instance, by doubling advocacy for its own plan.66 These are all 
indications that the Administration over the course of September 2013 eventually succumbed 
to congressional pressure and opposition against the planned military strikes against Syria.  
 
The Influence of Bureaucratic Politics on Foreign Policy Making and the Use of Force  
The Obama-administration’s Syria policy has for a long time been subject to heated debate. 
As the previous section demonstrated, government officials and lawmakers have often been at 
odds with how to proceed in the Syrian case. However, it would be naïve to assume that there 
was a clear consensus within the Administration on the matter of Syria. The most apparent 
clash of visions and interests within the Administration seem to have been between the White 
House and the State Department on the one hand and the Defense Department on the other 
hand. On multiple occasions, Pentagon officials have warned against or reacted with caution 
to proposals coming from the White House and the State Department. 
 As early as March 2012, Pentagon officials warned that a US military intervention in 
Syria would be a “daunting and protracted operation”, “with the potential for killing vast 
numbers of civilians.”67 The Pentagon issued its warning when making preliminary military 
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contingency plans, in response to a request by President Obama. At the time, the 
Administration still believed in diplomatic and economic means to pressure the Assad-
regime.68 So, in early 2012, the Administration and the Pentagon still shared a similar vision 
on Syria: all options should be on the table, but given the perils of a military intervention, 
diplomatic and economic means were to be preferred.  
 Frictions in the Obama-administration on the Syrian issue started to arise in 2013. A 
strong signal of disagreement within the Administration became visible during April 2013 
congressional hearings on Syria. In separate appearances, Secretary of State John Kerry and 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel provided two sharply different perspectives on the Syrian 
opposition.69 Mr. Kerry was optimistic, emphasizing the opportunities in working with the 
opposition. In his account, the US had been working “very, very closely” with the Syrian 
opposition (short of providing lethal aid), which had strengthened the Syrian resistance.70 
Besides, Mr. Kerry expressed his confidence in the moderate elements in the opposition and 
the opposition’s “headway on the ground.”71 Mr. Hagel and General Dempsey, on the 
contrary, appeared to be much more pessimistic about the Syrian opposition and the military 
situation in Syria in general. General Dempsey retreated from an earlier position in which he 
supported arming trusted elements of the Syrian opposition, because he was no longer sure the 
US “could clearly identify the right people” within the opposition.72 Directly contradicting 
Mr. Kerry’s earlier statement that the opposition was making headway, General Dempsey 
warned about “a risk that this conflict has become stalemated.”73 When asked by lawmakers 
about the Pentagon’s role in assessing “additional military responses”, Mr. Hagel and General 
Dempsey surprised by responding that the White House had never asked the Pentagon for any 
recommendations, only for options.74  The April 2013 congressional hearing thus showed an 
Administration that fundamentally disagreed on a most basic assessment of the situation in 
Syria. Retrospectively, it can be identified as one of the first instances in which the State 
Department and the Department of Defense publicly clashed.  
 A second instance came in July 2013, when General Dempsey explicitly warned 
against the expected “unintended consequences” of any US military action in Syria in a 
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briefing to the US Senate.75 General Dempsey’s gloomy assessment of the different military 
options (ranging from arming and training the rebels to mastering complete control of Syria’s 
chemical stocks), which would all be “costly and uncertain” did not line up with Mr. Kerry’s 
earlier statements and with President Obama’s announcement in June 2013 that he would 
intensify the cooperation with the Syrian opposition (with some government officials 
confirming that this would include lethal aid, such as the delivery of light weaponry and 
ammunition to the Syrian opposition).76 The Guardian explained the divisions within the 
Obama-administration from efforts to balance “a desire to avoid another war in the Middle 
East with ending one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters.”77 Based on the above 
discussion, the former desire was clearly embodied by the Department of Defense and the 
latter by the White House and the State Department. By July 2013, a rift within the 
Administration had clearly formed.  
 The rift seems to have originated from early doubts in the Pentagon about President 
Obama’s red line statement of August 2012. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in 
a January 2014 interview it was a “serious mistake” for President Obama to draw a “red line” 
on chemical weapons use.78 A former intelligence official confirmed that many in the US 
national security establishment had long been troubled by the President’s red line (Hersh 
2014). According to this official, the Joint Chief of Staff had asked the White House for 
clarity on the exact meaning of the red line and how it would translate in military orders 
(Hersh 2014). The Pentagon then studied how the threat could be carried out, but learnt little 
about the President’s reasoning (Hersh 2014). 
  Right after the August 2013 sarin attacks, when President Obama announced a 
“limited military strike”, disagreement between the White House and the Pentagon seems to 
have arisen over the scope and the intensity of the mission. The White House allegedly 
rejected an early Pentagon plan involving targets for bombing, because it was “insufficiently 
painful” to the Assad-regime (Hersh 2014). According to the former intelligence official, 
original targets included “only military sites and nothing by way of civilian infrastructure.” 
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Under White House pressure the target list was expanded in a way that one could no longer 
reasonably speak of a “limited, military strike”. The new target list was meant to “completely 
eradicate any military capabilities Assad had” (Hersh 2014). According to investigative 
journalist Hersh (2014), General Dempsey had been skeptical about a US strike on Syria ever 
since it was announced, as he was concerned about an escalation of the conflict to the wider 
region. He also had serious doubts about the Administration’s argument that it had the 
evidence that the Assad-regime was behind the sarin attacks. Given the fact that Assad-forces 
were winning ground, it did not make sense for the regime to use chemical weapons at that 
point of time (Hersh 2014). When intelligence reached Mr. Dempsey that seriously 
questioned the regime’s involvement with the attacks, he allegedly convinced the President to 
call off the strike (Hersh 2014). According to this account, the official White House story of 
seeking congressional authorization for the strikes was just a way to sell the turnabout to the 
public (Hersh 2014). Some caution with Hersh’s account is warranted though, since it is 
mostly based on hear-say evidence from anonymous sources within the Obama-
administration. Still, there are more sources showing doubts in the Pentagon about the White 
House’s plans for strikes.    
 A Washington Post article published on 30 August 2013 showed widespread 
skepticism about the strikes within the US military.79 Having assumed for months that the US 
was unlikely to intervene militarily in Syria, the Defense Department was caught off guard by 
the White House’s ‘sudden’ announcements of strikes.80 The announcement had made many 
in the armed services ‘uneasy’, as interviews with officers ranging from captains to a four-star 
general showed. Retired Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold directly questioned the expertise of the 
White House on military matters: “There’s a broad naiveté in the political class about 
America’s obligations in foreign policy issues, and scary simplicity about the effects that 
employing American military power can achieve.”81 Others shared this notion, by arguing that 
there was a lack of clarity about political ends (“if it’s just punishment, there are other 
means”).82 Another concern was that the White House spent insufficient time thinking 
through “potential unintended consequences” of the operation, including resilience by the 
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Assad-regime, new rounds of chemical weapon attacks and a military response by Israel.83 
One officer wondered how the Administration could conceive of a new military operation, 
while the US was still in the midst of retreating from Afghanistan. Last, but certainly not the 
least, officers complained that the White House only consulted military personnel in a “pro-
forma manner”, further contributing to frustrations within the Pentagon. The fact that the 
Washington Post interviewed military officers from all different ranks contributes to the 
representativeness of the reporting and it shows that skepticism was not limited to the 
Pentagon’s leadership.84 
 Based on the above analysis, it seems that the Pentagon has had a consistent 
preference for non-intervention in Syria. The White House, on the contrary, seems to have 
shifted preferences: whereas in early 2012, it still preferred diplomatic and economic means 
to pressure the Assad-regime,85 it started more active support for the opposition forces in 2013 
(US State Department 2013). The driving factor behind this change in preferences seems to be 
the President’s ‘red-lines statement’ of August 2012. This statement forced the President to 
act when news of the March/April 2013 chemical attacks spread. From then on, the 
Administration announced it would expand non-lethal support for the rebels (US State 
Department 2013), with other sources confirming that lethal aid was included as well. 86 The 
Pentagon, however, was reluctant in going along with this change, as indicated by General 
Dempsey’s skepticism about any military option in his July 2013 briefing to the US Senate.87  
The observed difference in preferences on Syria caused some visible conflicts between 
the White House and the State Department on the one side and the Pentagon on the other side 
in 2013, and continues to do so in 2014.88 The evidence presented also supports the idea that 
throughout 2013, President Obama was confronted with contradicting assessments on the 
situation in Syria. If this really led to the cancellation of the strikes in August 2013, as Hersh 
argued, cannot be definitively concluded based on the available evidence. Neither can it be 
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denied that the Pentagon’s consistent concerns with US military involvement in Syria must 
have played a role in the Administration’s decision-making on intervention. Given the 
Defense Department’s expertise on national security issues and the use of force, the White 
House could not have afforded to simply disregard its concerns and objections to the plans on 
strikes against Syria. For this reason, this ‘bureaucratic-politics’ explanation must surely be 
accounted for  when explaining the eventual cancellation of US strikes against Syria in 
September 2013. 
 
The Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Making and the Use of Force  
In order to assess the influence of public opinion on US decision-making on Syria in the 
aftermath of the August 2013 sarin attacks, two factors have to be looked at: first, whether the 
American public cared about the events in Syria and the plans of the Administration to 
intervene in the conflict (issue salience) and second, whether the public opinion was strong in 
one direction (either supporting or opposing an intervention). Assessing the salience of the 
Syrian question is of prior importance, for if the public did not care about the issue at all, it 
would not likely have played a big role in the Administration’s decision-making.  
This analysis assesses the salience of the Syrian conflict and American public opinion 
on the issue over time, in the period ranging from December 2012 to September 2013. The 
advantage of such a temporal analysis is that it can potentially show the influence of  evolving 
external events on public opinion: it could be, for instance, that the American public did not 
care much about the Syrian conflict in 2012, but that this changed after the August 2013 sarin 
attacks. Or, it may be that the American public was turned against an intervention until 
August 2013, but changed its mind after seeing the horror of the sarin attacks. These, of 
course, are all hypothetical examples, but they do show that a temporal analysis is capable of 
showing changes in public mood over time.  
 A December 2012 Pew Research Center survey showed that only 38% of the 
American people followed the political violence in Syria closely.89 The respondents also 
demonstrated little appetite for US intervention in the conflict: more than 60% of the 
respondents answered that the United States did not have a responsibility “to do something in 
Syria.”90 About the same percentage (65%) opposed arming anti-government rebels in Syria. 
According to the Pew Research Center, these attitudes had remained relatively unchanged 
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since the Spring of 2012.91 2012 was thus a year in which the salience of the Syrian conflict to 
the American public was limited (with a majority of people not closely following the news on 
the conflict) and in which the public was clearly turned against any further US involvement in 
the conflict.  
 The Pew Research Center conducted another survey round in late April 2013, when 
evidence of the (limited) use of chemical weapons in Syria flowed in and political pressure on 
the Obama-administration to act increased.92 First of all, the April 2013 survey showed that 
just 18% of the public said to have followed the news about the Syrian chemical weapons 
issue very closely.93 This marks a 20% drop in public interest in the Syrian issue since the 
December 2012 survey. Support for a military intervention in Syria had increased, with now 
45% of the American public favoring an intervention if it were confirmed that the Syrian 
government had used chemical weapons against anti-government groups.94 Although this 
group did not constitute a majority, it did form a plurality, as smaller groups said they 
opposed military action (31%) or did not have an opinion on intervention (23%).95 The 
alleged use of chemical weapons thus seemed to have an effect on American public opinion, 
as an earlier survey in March 2013 still showed a clear majority (64%) turned against even 
arming the Syrian rebels.96 Still, not too much should be made of the April 2013 survey 
results. With only 18% of the American public following the news on Syria closely, the public 
most likely did not exert too much pressure on the Obama-administration in taking a decision 
either way.  
 This public disengagement with the Syrian conflict seemed to have dramatically 
changed in the aftermath of the August 2013 sarin attacks. In a mid-September 2013 Pew 
Research Center survey, 45% of the respondents indicated it had followed the news on Syria 
(“Possible U.S. airstrikes in Syria and diplomatic efforts to have Syria give up control of its 
chemical weapons.”)‘very closely’ and 31% stated it had followed the news ‘fairly closely’ 
(PollingReport.com 2013). Compared to April 2013, there thus was a rise of 27% in people 
closely following the news on Syria very closely. As of September 2013, an impressive total 
of 76% of the American public thus displayed at least some interest in the ongoing 
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developments regarding Syria (PollingReport.com 2013). A Gallup Poll conducted in the 
same month (11-12 September) also showed considerable public interest in news about the 
civil war in Syria, with a total of 70% Americans either following the news ‘very closely’ 
(31%) or ‘somewhat closely’ (39%) (PollingReport.com 2013). It can thus be reasonably 
assumed that the Syrian issue was salient to the American public in the aftermath of the sarin 
attacks. However, did these attacks affect a similar change in the American appetite for 
intervention? This cannot be said to be the case.  
Polls conducted by multiple organizations showed clear majorities of Americans 
opposed to a military intervention in Syria. ABC News/Washington Post Polls showed 
consistent majorities against US missile strikes on Syria, even under the assumption that the 
Assad-regime was indeed responsible for the sarin attacks (PollingReport.com 2013). Their 
late August poll showed 36% supportive of an intervention and 59% opposing, with support 
dropping further in September polls, to only 30% (PollingReport.com 2013). Gallup Poll polls 
also showed drops in support for U.S. military action against Syria: in its 3-4 September 2013 
poll, 36 % favored and 51% opposed an intervention; in its 11-12 September poll, only 28% 
still favored an intervention, with 62% being opposed (PollingReport.com 2013). The highest 
number of support for a military intervention was found in a late-August NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal Poll, with 50% supportive and 44% opposing (6% was unsure) 
(PollingReport.com 2013). Two caveats with this poll are in place, however: the question was 
phrased very narrowly (with US military action only directed against those military units and 
infrastructure directly used in carrying out the chemical attacks) and support for such a 
limited intervention dropped in a second round to 44%, with now 51% opposed 
(PollingReport.com 2013).    
 To put it shortly, the salience of the Syrian conflict significantly increased after the 
August 2013 sarin attacks, but public opposition against US military intervention in Syria 
remained largely unchanged. And if it changed, public opposition against an intervention 
actually increased compared to earlier figures (the April 2013 Pew Research Center poll).97 
Relating this to the hypothesis, H3a can be said to be fulfilled: in August/September 2013, the 
Syrian issue was a salient foreign policy topic, increasing the likelihood that the President 
took public opinion into account when making a decision on intervention. H3b is also 
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fulfilled: given high salience and strong public sentiment against intervention, the likelihood 
of the President intervening in an outside conflict (Syria) can be assumed to have decreased.  
It is tempting to conclude, based on the evidence presented, that the Obama-
administration was dissuaded from an intervention in Syria at least partly due to public 
opposition against the strikes. Although this sounds very plausible, the mere presence of 
public opposition against the strikes and eventual US non-intervention in Syria alone does not 
constitute a correlation between the two. For that to be established, it is important to look at 
the President’s statements and speeches of the time: did he mention public opinion relating to 
Syria, and if he did, in what way?  
President Obama was in a precarious position in the period of August/September 
2013. On the one hand, in order to avoid a domestic backlash resulting from making empty 
commitments on the international arena, the President must have felt an incentive to enforce 
his ‘red line’ and go ahead with the strikes (Tomz 2009, 830). On the other hand, with 
majorities opposed against an intervention, going ahead with the strikes would not have 
boosted the President’s approval ratings either. In a Q&A-session during the G20 summit in 
Russia in early-September 2013, the President acknowledged the weight of public opinion, 
but hinted it was not the leading factor in his decision on an intervention. In a response to a 
reporter’s question, President Obama conceded that at the end of the day, he may not persuade 
a majority of the American people that a strike against Syria would be  “the right thing to 
do.”98 At the same time, he believed that Congressmen and he himself as President should not 
only listen to their constituents, but also needed to make decisions about what they “believed 
was right for America.” The President admitted that “a whole bunch of decisions” he made 
were unpopular, but he did so, because he  thought they were the right thing to do and he 
trusted his constituents to allow him to come up with his best judgment, for that they elected 
(and re-elected) him.99  The last point the President made in his statement was that “these 
kinds of interventions are always unpopular, because they seem distant and removed.”100 
Based on his statement during the G-20 summit, it would be far-fetched to stick to the 
premise that public opinion was a major factor in dissuading the President from an 
intervention in Syria. The President’s statement clearly indicated his awareness of the public 
mood on intervention, but instead of ‘following the polls’, he mentioned his responsibility to 
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ultimately do what “is right for America”.101 So, in the end, the available evidence does not 
fully support the hypothesis under consideration: although Americans displayed considerable 
interest in a potential intervention in Syria and were in majorities opposed to these plans, this 
factor does not really seem to have influenced the Administration’s willingness to intervene in 
Syria. 
 
The Influence of International Incentives on Foreign Policy Making and the Use of 
Force 
This analysis will assess the role of normative, political and military incentives for 
intervention one by one. This is not to say that these incentives can always be completely 
separated from each other, but it helps in structuring the analysis. The final part of the 
analysis will assess the relative weight of the different international incentives under 
consideration.   
 
Normative Incentives Impacting on the US’ Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
The US government has had a consistent concern with the potential use of chemical weapons 
in the Syrian conflict. In his well-known August 2012 ‘red-lines’ statement, President Obama 
first emphasized the significance of these weapons in his decision-making on Syria: 
 
“The issue of chemical weapons doesn’t just concern Syria; it concerns our close allies in the 
region, including Israel. It concerns us.  We cannot have a situation where chemical or 
biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been very clear to 
the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start 
seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.  That would 
change my calculus. That would change my equation.” 
  - Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps, 20 August 2012 
 
The President’s statement was first put to the test in March and April 2013, when a few minor 
uses by chemical weapons were reported on by the UN.102 The attacks, however, did not 
attract much media attention and the Obama-administration sufficed with repeating its earlier 
stated red line and it assigned responsibility (with a high degree of confidence) to the Assad-
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regime (US Department of Defense 2013). As a response, it later decided to increase ‘non-
lethal support’ to the opposition (US State Department 2013). 
 The critical test of the President’s ‘red line’, however, only really came about on 21 
August 2013, when a large scale sarin attack claimed the lives of hundreds of Syrians.103 
Washington responded soon by publicly condemning the chemical attacks, firmly assigning 
responsibility to the Assad-regime and, eventually, announcing plans for a “limited military 
strike” against Syria, to punish the Assad-regime for the use of chemical weapons.104 
Speeches and statements by US government officials in the time show the strong normative 
component underlying the Administration’s plan to intervene in Syria. A good example of this 
is the speech that President Obama gave on 31 August 2013, the first time that he addressed 
the nation on the chemical attacks and a US response.   
First of all, the President described the horror of the attacks by calling them “an assault 
on human dignity” and a “heinous act” (White House 2013). Second, the President 
emphasized the implications of the sarin attacks for international law and norms: “It (the 
attack) risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It 
could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation to terrorist groups who 
would do our people harm” (White House 2013).  Third, the President stressed the clash of 
the attacks with American values: “We cannot raise our children in a world where we will not 
follow through on the things we say, the accords we sign, the values that define us,” and “our 
security and our values demand that we cannot turn away from the massacre of countless 
civilians with chemical weapons” (White House 2013). These remarks by President Obama 
show that the Obama-administration was predominantly motivated by normative concerns 
(both legal and moral) in its condemnation and response to the use of chemical weapons in 
Syria. It then, in turn, explains how the White House arrived at its plans of a ‘limited, military 
strike’ against Syria: given its strong normative concern about the use of chemical weapons, 
first communicated to the world in August 2012, the White House felt obliged to come up 
with a robust response, or as President Obama phrased it: “In a world with many dangers, this 
menace must be confronted” (White House 2013).  
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Political Incentives Impacting on the US’ Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
Political incentives also played a major role in US decision-making in the aftermath of the 
Ghouta-attacks. In the first place, the political credibility of President Obama at home and the 
credibility of the US in the world was at stake. Ever since President Obama drew his red line 
in August 2012, the world had focused its attention on Washington: any sign that the 
President’s red  line was crossed in Syria would need a firm and unequivocal response by the 
US if it was to maintain its credibility. At home, critics of the Obama-administration could 
easily exploit supposed unanswered crossings of the President’s red line as signs of 
‘presidential weakness’.105 The media further raised the stakes by intensive reporting on the 
President’s ‘red line’ in the aftermath of the sarin attacks in August 2013. The Washington 
Post commented on the many twists that the Administration gave to President Obama’s red 
line,106 and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented in a news show: 
“What makes the US look weaker: drawing a line and not enforcing it or drawing a line and 
then only delivering a pin prick?”107 Given the fact that his political credibility was on the 
line,108 President Obama must have felt an inclination to follow through on his earlier made 
threats and go ahead with the strikes against Syria. This first political incentive thus made the 
President more likely to intervene in Syria. 
 A second political consideration will have had an opposite effect on US decision 
making. After being elected as the President who would bring an end to US wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the President must have felt reluctant in engaging in yet another 
‘military adventure’.109 In fact, President Obama mentioned this in his ‘Syria-speech’ on 31 
August 2013: “I know well that we are weary of war.  We’ve ended one war in Iraq.  We’re 
ending another in Afghanistan. And the American people have the good sense to know we 
cannot resolve the underlying conflict in Syria with our military” (White House 2013). 
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However, a few phrases later, the President indicated that another concern took precedence 
for him: “But we are the United States of America, and we cannot and must not turn a blind 
eye to what happened in Damascus” (White House 2013). So, although the President 
acknowledged American war-weariness, a factor that could have weighed against starting yet 
another military intervention, his concern of what had happened in Damascus seemed to 
override this factor.  
However, not only a war-weary American public may have created doubts in the 
Administration. The risk of imperial overstretch, a situation in which a state (‘imperial’ refers 
to the empires that are central in Kennedy’s (1989) analysis) extends itself beyond its ability 
to maintain or expand its military and economic commitments, will also have crossed the 
minds of Washington policy-makers (Kennedy 1989). After having fought very costly wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (with the former not yet fully ended) and being in the midst of a power 
shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific,110 an intervention in Syria may have looked like a 
‘gamble’. Political commentators also stressed Syria’s limited strategic importance to the US, 
compared to other states in the region, such as Egypt and Iran.111 The limited strategic 
importance of Syria in the context of ongoing commitments and future security challenges 
may have eventually induced the Obama-administration to call off an intervention. This 
however, seems not to be a particularly plausible explanation. The assessment of Syria’s 
strategic importance would have logically come prior to the Administration’s announcements 
of strikes. One may reasonably assume that if Syria was indeed of a too limited strategic 
importance, it would not have ‘qualified’ for a US intervention. Based on this rationale, it is 
unlikely that Syria’s limited strategic importance to the US eventually dissuaded the US 
government from a strike against it. 
World sentiment on US strikes against Syria was at best divided. Polls showed much 
skepticism about the strikes among Western publics, with majorities turned against an 
intervention.112  At a G20-meeting in early September 2013, world leaders also issued caution 
about a military intervention in Syria and some of them openly opposed these plans. Russian 
President Putin was a leading opponent of any military option in Syria. In an opinion-editorial 
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in the New York Times, he argued that US strikes against Syria would qualify as an ‘act of 
aggression.’113 Russia, however, was not the only one arguing against an intervention. 
Chinese President Xi Jinping attempted to dissuade President Obama from military action, 
telling him that “Beijing expected countries to think twice before acting.”114 Germany showed 
its reservations by not signing a statement at the end of the G-20 meeting, calling for a strong 
international response against the sarin attacks in Syria. The states that did sign (President 
Obama eventually convinced 10 fellow leaders to sign) did not agree on including support for 
military strikes in the statement. The watered-down agreement led President Putin to assert 
that “the only countries to support the use of force were Canada, Saudi-Arabia, France and 
Turkey,” an assertion that was obviously denied by the White House.115 In sum, the Obama-
administration faced opposition against its plan for strikes against Syria from leading states at 
the G20-meeting and from sceptic publics in the West. However, the fact that President 
Obama resisted Russian pressure during the G-20 meeting and continued his effort to enlist 
the support of his colleagues makes it unlikely that the lack of global support was the decisive 
factor in dissuading the Obama-administration from an intervention in Syria.116 
A final political consideration to be assessed is the attractiveness of the option of 
intervention at the time and potential alternatives to this option. For quite some time after the 
sarin attacks, ‘limited strikes’ against Syria were the only conceivable option to the Obama-
administration. With such a clear crossing of President Obama’s red line, the US simply had 
to come up with a robust response.117 Besides, there was a sentiment in the Administration, 
most clearly expressed by US ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, that the US “had 
exhausted the alternatives.”118 Despite a year of diplomatic pressure, the Assad-regime was 
apparently bold enough to defy the US and still use chemical weapons, an act for which it had 
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to be held accountable.119 The Obama-administration consistently argued the case of ‘limited 
military strikes’ against Syria until a ‘rhetorical comment’ by Secretary of State John Kerry 
seemed to provide an opening on  9 September 2013. In response to a reporter’s question, Mr. 
Kerry stated that President Assad could avoid a U.S. military strike by surrendering “all his 
chemical weapons within a week.”120 Although the US State Department was quick in 
downplaying Mr. Kerry’s comment, calling it a ‘rhetorical argument’, Russia seized the 
opportunity and proposed this option to Syria.121 It turned out to be a game-changer: Syria 
committed quickly to the plan. On Tuesday September 10, the day after the plan was 
proposed, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem stated that Syria was “ready to inform 
about the location of chemical weapons, halt the production of chemical weapons and show 
these objects” to the world.122     
The Obama-administration initially responded with cautious optimism to the Russian 
proposal: while welcoming the Russian proposal, the Administration warned against ‘stalling 
tactics’ and said it had to take this proposal “initially with a grain of salt.”123 Still, President 
Obama announced that the Administration would “run this (the proposal) to ground” and that 
Secretary of State John Kerry would talk to his Russian counterpart to assess the ‘seriousness’ 
of the proposals. Significantly, on the same day President Obama first expressed doubts about 
his campaign in Congress for authorization, stating about the outcome of a vote: “I wouldn’t 
say I’m confident.”124 Two days later, on September 11, the President put military action 
against Syria on hold and vowed to pursue diplomacy to remove Syria’s chemical weapons, 
stating that he had “a deeply held preference for peaceful solutions.”125 On September 14, the 
US and Russia reached an agreement on the chemical disarmament of Syria by mid-2014.126 
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At the end of the month, the agreement was officially sanctioned by a UN Security Council 
resolution.127  
The ‘sudden’ availability of a credible political alternative to strikes against Syria  thus 
seems to have played an important role in dissuading the Obama-administration from an 
intervention. Whereas the Administration had consistently argued for strikes against Syria till 
September 9, it changed its tone after  Russia came up with its proposal. The fact that it took 
the US government only five days to come to an agreement with the Russians on the proposal 
shows the Administration was eager to free itself from the ‘red line trap’.   
 
Military Incentives Impacting on the US’ Willingness to Intervene in Syria 
One of the most prominent military considerations in the lead-up to the strike must have been 
whether such a “limited, military strike” would be a) feasible and b) effective in terms of 
accomplishing its goals. On the feasibility of the strike it can be reasonable assumed that the 
US, given its preponderance in military power, would have been capable of conducting the 
strikes. However, it would be naïve to assume that that would have been an easy task. As 
General Dempsey emphasized in July 2013, “Assad’s regime could withstand limited air 
strikes,” and they would do little more than a “significant degradation of regime capabilities 
and an increase in regime desertions".128 Costs of such an operation would have run “in the 
billions.”129 Reports released in 2012 by the British military think thank Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirmed that “Western powers would face significantly 
bigger challenges in intervening against President Bashar Assad, both politically and 
militarily, than they did in Libya.”130 In short, the US can be assumed to have been capable of 
conducting the strikes, but it would have been far from an easy task. 
 Second, serious questions about the effectiveness of the strikes have likely been raised. 
To assess the effectiveness, first the stated goals of the operation must be identified. In his 
August 31 address, President Obama summed up the goals of the announced strikes: to “hold 
the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of behavior, 
and degrade their capacity to carry it out” (White House 2013). On 6 September 2013, UN 
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Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power also mentioned the importance of a signaling-effect: 
“We cannot afford to signal to North-Korea and Iran that the international community is 
unwilling to act to prevent proliferation or willing to tolerate the use of weapons of mass 
destruction (White House 2013a). In terms of enforcing accountability of the Assad-regime 
and deterring “this kind of behavior”, a US military strike would have showed a clear 
message to the world: from then on, any regime (or non-state actor) would have to take 
military retribution in mind when considering the use of weapons of mass destruction. Still, 
there were Congressmen who feared that the strikes would be ‘too symbolic’ and that they 
might actually embolden the Assad-regime.131  
Another concern was the goal of degrading the Syrian’s regime’s capacity to carry out 
future chemical attacks. As General Dempsey stated, air strikes would lead to a “significant 
degradation of regime capabilities”, but this would fall short of preventing future use of these 
weapons.132 For that goal, "thousands of special operations forces and other ground forces 
would be needed to assault and secure critical sites", and “"a no-fly zone as well as air and 
missile strikes", according to General Dempsey.133 A much more effective and cost-efficient 
guarantee against the future use of chemical weapons was therefore not a military response, 
but a political solution, as the one that was eventually found.  
 Besides the limited effectiveness of air strikes on Syria in terms of preventing future 
use of chemical weapons in Syria, the main concern of the Pentagon has appeared to be the 
adjective ‘limited’ in the Administration’s plan of conducting a ‘limited, military strike’. 
According to Hersh (2014), the White House rejected multiple plans for targets for bombing 
designed by the Pentagon, because they would be insufficiently “painful” to the Assad regime 
(Hersh 2014). The target list was eventually getting longer every day and at last, it included 
‘any military capabilities Assad had’, covering even electric power grids and oil and gas 
depots (Hersh 2014). According to the same source, General Dempsey’s initial view on the 
White House’s plan for a US strike is that it would be a ‘military blunder’. Hersh (2014) 
argued that it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who eventually convinced the White House to 
change course, because it had indications that if the US would go ahead with its plans of a 
strike ‘the Middle East would go up in smoke’ if it was carried out.  
                                                                 
131
 Tom Shanker, C.J. Chivers and Michael Gordon, “Pentagon Sees Syrian Military, Not Chemical Sites, as  
  Target,” The New York Times, 27 August, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi - 
  bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=521d8eb15 (accessed June 8, 2014). 
132
 Spencer Ackerman, “US military intervention in Syria would create 'unintended consequences' ,” The  
  Guardian, 22 July, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/us -military-intervention- 
  syria (accessed June 8, 2014). 
133
 Idem 
47 
 
It is important to re-emphasize that Hersh’s account is controversial, only partly 
confirmed (based on limited and anonymous sources) and sometimes directly contradicts 
Washington’s official version of events. However, Hersh’s depiction of a skeptical General 
Dempsey, who was being concerned about the risks of escalation of  the proposed strikes, is 
quite plausible. In fact, it is very much in line with the General’s consistent opposition to any 
US military involvement in Syria, demonstrated by his comments in July 2013, but also on 
other occasions. The earlier cited Washington Post article also confirms the concerns within 
the US military about the risks of a military operation in Syria.134 These observations increase 
the persuasiveness of the explanation that the risks and the ‘potential unintended 
consequences’ of strikes against Syria were leading in the Administration’s decision to cancel 
these plans.  
 
Weighing the Impact of International Incentives 
In sum, it can be said that normative (both legal and moral) incentives strongly motivated the 
Obama-administration to hold the Assad-regime to account for its alleged use of chemical 
weapons in August 2013. The Administration also had a strong political motive to follow 
through on its threats, as the political credibility of President Obama and the US in general 
were at stake. After all, how would the US look in the world’s eyes if it proved incapable or 
unwilling to enforce its own ‘red line’? Other political considerations, such as the  war-
weariness of the American public and the risk of ‘imperial overstretch’ would have weighed 
against an intervention, but these factors, for reasons indicated, are unlikely to have played a 
decisive role in US decision-making in the direct aftermath of the sarin attacks. What remains 
is a strong incentive against intervention: the limited effectiveness of any military strike in 
avoiding another ‘Ghouta-incident’ and the risks and ‘potential unintended consequences 
associated with such a military operation. In the clash of moral and political incentives on the 
one hand and military and material incentives on the other hand, the latter seemed to have 
taken precedence at the end of the day. The Russian proposal, which constituted the first 
credible political alternative to the announced strikes, then provided the Obama-
administration a way out of this foreign policy crisis in which it could ‘save face’.   
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Conclusion 
The puzzling observation of high-level US officials’ announcements of a military strike in 
Syria in August 2013 and, within a timespan of weeks, a complete cancellation of those plans 
motivated this research. The aim of this research was to assess which factors contributed to 
the shifting US willingness to intervene in Syria in the aftermath of the August 2013 sarin 
attacks and in what way those factors contributed. A distinction was made between domestic 
and international factors impacting on US-decision making on Syria. Given the abundance of 
international explanations found in the academic and public debate, this research opted for a 
domestic orientation. The influence of three domestic factors (institutional checks on the 
executive, the influence of bureaucratic politics and the role of public opinion) on US 
decision-making was assessed and this was finally contrasted to a more ‘conventional’ 
internationally-oriented hypothesis.  
 The evidence presented in the analysis supports the notion that US domestic factors 
mattered in the Obama-administration’s decision-making on Syria. Congressional concerns 
played a role in the decision of the Administration to seek congressional approval instead of 
going ahead with the strikes on its own. The strong opposition voiced during the House 
hearing in September and the public announcements of Congressmen that they would vote 
against a use-of-force resolution also put pressure on the Administration’s plans. The 
disagreements within the Obama-administration played an even more important role. There 
was no common perception of the situation in Syria within the Administration and there were 
disagreements about the adequacy of different policy responses. Since President Obama had 
drawn his ‘red line’, the White House and the State Department were inclined to push for 
more action in Syria, whereas the Defense Department continued its warnings against further 
US involvement. This came to a breaking point in the period after the sarin attacks, with 
multiple sources showing widespread discontent within the US military about the White 
House’s proposed plans for strikes against Syria. The concerns of constituents were frequently 
mentioned by Congressmen in the lead-up to the planned strikes, but President’s Obama’s 
statements indicated that public opinion was not a leading factor in the Administration’s 
decision-making on intervention.  
  On the international arena, there were important normative incentives for the 
Administration to enforce the President’s red line. The sarin attacks constituted a violation of 
international law and a clash with American values, as President Obama emphasized in his 
address to the nation on Syria. The political credibility of the President and the US were also 
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at stake now that the President’s red line was crossed. At the same time, there were strong 
military reservations about the proposed strikes. There were doubts about the effectiveness of 
the strikes in deterring future use of chemical weapons in Syria and the risks and potential 
unintended consequences associated with the plan were numerous. Many feared an escalation 
of the conflict. The Russian plan of Syria’s chemical disarmament eventually provided a 
credible and even preferable alternative to the Administration’s plans of strikes and the 
Obama-administration proved eager to seize this opportunity. Within the time spans of days, 
the US and Russia came to an agreement, which effectively ruled out the option of strikes 
against Syria.  
 When weighing the evidence, it seems that the disagreements within the Obama-
administration formed the most important domestic determinant in US willingness to 
intervene, while, on the international arena, military considerations seem to have been most 
influential at the end of the day. The finding that domestic political factors mattered in the 
Administration’s decision-making is significant, given the fact that this research focused on 
decision-making during an international crisis situation at its peak. This goes against Realist 
predictions that international factors are leading in states’ behavior on the international arena, 
especially at times of international crises (Waltz 1979). This research also speaks to the 
literature dealing with ‘audience costs’ and it shows that, counterintuitively, not following 
through on earlier made commitments can sometimes be the preferable course of action. 
Whereas Tomz (2009) showed that leaders who do not follow through on threats made on the 
international arena are vulnerable to domestic backlash, following through in Syria would 
have meant that President Obama would have pursued a policy option that was strongly 
opposed by the American public.   
 This study leaves ample opportunity for future research. For instance, scholars could 
contrast different decision-making models (such as psychological and rational-choice models) 
to the ‘bureaucratic politics’-model applied to decision-making on Syria in this research. This 
research is also of interest to scholars focusing on the relationship between public opinion and 
foreign policy making. This case could then be used as an instance of the relationship between 
the two during an international crisis, which could then be contrasted to their relationship in 
non-crisis situations. Finally, scholars of International Relations could bring the findings of 
this research in comparative perspective, by assessing the factors and processes identified  
here for a number of interventions in the past. This could then also illuminate why those 
interventions did take place, whereas the one in Syria eventually did not.  
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 More on a policy note, this research has demonstrated that the President’s ‘red line’ 
brought the Obama-administration in a very precarious position in the aftermath of the sarin 
attacks. The danger of drawing ‘red lines’ is that it strongly narrows the options  available to 
governments dealing with foreign crises. The case exemplified this: since President Obama’ 
had drawn his red line, the White House was pushed in a direction that it had to do more and 
more to uphold its credibility. This inclination to do more was at odds with a more prudent 
course of action, as advocated by the Defense Department, which was sober about what US 
military power could achieve in this case compared to political and diplomatic means. Since 
flexibility is critical in responding to crises, it is highly advisable for the US to prevent early 
commitment to a certain policy path when dealing with future crises.  
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